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Abstract 
We analyze a new blue chips (large caps) stock index for France from 1854 to 1998. We detail 
its methodology and show that it differs profoundly from earlier indices, and that it is more consistent 
with the French financial and economic history. We suggest this result casts some doubt on many 
historical stock indices such as those gathered in Dimson, Marsh and Staunton’ Triumph of the 
Optimists. We also provide some major results: investment in French stocks provided a positive real 
return during the 19th century, but a negative one – because of inflation and wars – in the 20th. Despite 
this century of negative real performance, stocks are still the best financial asset for the very long run 
but, with an equity premium lower than in the US. 
 
 
 
Most empirical knowledge on the long term performance of financial investments is derived from the 
behaviour of the most successful markets. Those of the United States – and more broadly Anglo-
Saxon countries – have been termed survivor markets2. The United States, in particular, suffered no 
war on their national territory in more than a century, limited inflation and no true socialism. They 
                                                 
1   We thank Elroy Dimson for the index published in his book, E. Dimson, Georges Gallais-Hamonno, 
François Gourio, Bruce Lehmann, Kim Oosterlink, Christian Rietsch, Eugene White and two anonymous 
referees for detailed and useful comments, as well as participants at seminars in Orléans and Paris, at the 
World Cliometrics conference (Edinburgh), the European Business History Conference (Bergen) and the 
25th European Symposium on Money and Banking (Luxembourg). 
2   S.J. Brown, W. N. Goetzmann and S. A. Ross. “Survival”, The Journal of Finance, 50, no. 3 (1995): 
853-73. 
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developed modern financial theory and empirical studies earlier, so that their performance influences 
heavily what we think today about financial markets. Much of the rest of the world was not so 
fortunate. The Russian stock-exchanges and securities, which were thriving before World War One3, 
disappeared for 70 years. Clearly, the fate of investors in Russian securities from 1917 to 1992 can be 
understood without portfolio indices. But Russian stocks and bonds were part of many foreign 
portfolios (not least French ones) up until the Soviet Revolution, so that global performance must take 
them into account for a global measure. The same is true for other markets such as those of Austria-
Hungary or even China. In between happy Americans and poor Russians, most of Western Europe’s 
stock exchanges suffered a chaotic 20th century, but without complete disruption (Germany being the 
limit because of the 1923 hyperinflation and the post-1945 dismantlement). Recent research has tried 
to broaden the sample of markets studied to include them, with much reason since many of them were 
among the worlds’ most developed up until World War One or even during the interwar period 
(Brussels, Amsterdam, Paris, Berlin, Milan, etc), and they again weigh substantially in today’s global 
portfolio. The 2002 synthesis by Dimson, Marsh and Staunton proposes data on the 20th century for 16 
countries, and ends up with an optimistic tone, although less enthusiastic than most of the literature on 
the US case4. They show that with the exception of Sweden, Western European exchanges perform 
worse on average than those of overseas Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, the U.S., Australia and 
South-Africa) and the U.K.5. They attribute the poorer Italian, French, German or Belgian 
performances to the wars, inflation and nationalizations. But their data suggests that even in the worst 
                                                 
3  On Russia, see P.V. Lizunov, “Russian Securities in the Russian and European Stock Exchanges (end of 
the 19th - beginning of the 20th century)”, in: Ekonomicheskaja istorija. Ezhegodnik (Economic History. 
Yearbook). 2001, Moscow: Rosspen, 2002: 206-241; and, L. Borodkin and A. Konovalova, “Chaotic 
Dynamics of Share Prices at St. Petersburg Stock Market in the First Decade of the 20th century: Metal 
and Oil”, Working Paper presented at the XVth Conference of the international association for history and 
computing, 2003. 
4   E. Dimson, P. Marsh and M. Staunton, Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment 
Returns (Princeton, 2002). 
5   Dimson & al. Triumph of the Optimists, p. 50. On Sweden, P. Frennberg and B. Hansson. “Computation 
of a Monthly Index for Swedish Stocks Returns, 1919-1989” Scandinavian Economic History, 40, no. 1 
(1992): 3-27.  
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case – Belgium – the long-term stock market performance remains positive (2.5 per cent yearly real 
return over the 20th century), and superior to that of other investments.  
In this paper, we claim that a more detailed look at the methodology used in constructing stock market 
indices is required before any valid international comparison. Concentrating on the French case, we 
show that formerly accepted indices built on particular sets of assumptions can seriously mislead 
empirical finance research. If the theory and practice of indices has long been mastered by economists 
and statistical institutions (a 1922 book by Irving Fisher being still a major reference6), stock market 
indices have been built in many countries up until recently with different objectives than the measure 
of the return for the investor7. The Cowles commission in the 1930s was a pioneer in using indices in 
order to measure stock market performance from the point of view of an investor8. In spite of this, 
even the Standard & Poor’s index suffers serious flaws9. In France, the only early attempt to build 
indices in that same perspective, that of the newspaper Agefi in the 1930s, was short lived.  
In this paper, we propose a new stock index for the French stock market from 1854 to 1998, the first 
one built in order to measure variations in French stock prices from the point of view of the investor. 
We first describe the index’s methodology, which is based on Euronext’s CAC-40, adapting it slightly 
to take into account some constraints from historical research. Basically, the index is a monthly index 
of the 40 most prominent shares among French firms, ranked by market capitalization. Since the 
selection is adapted every year, we avoid survivor bias. Our index is weighted by these capitalizations 
and its composition and weights are adjusted yearly. These characteristics, which are standard for 
                                                 
6  I. Fisher, The Making of Index Numbers. A Study of their Varieties, Tests, and Reliability (New York, 
1922). 
7   W. Goetzmann “Will History Rhyme? The Past as financial Future”, WP Yale ICF no. 04-19, 2004; P.-
C. Hautcoeur “Why and How to Measure Stock Market Fluctuations? The Early History of Stock Market 
Indices, with Special Reference to the French Case ”, Working paper 2006 no. 10, Paris School of 
Economics. 
8   A. A. Cowles and co-authors. Common-Stock Indexes (Bloomington, 1938). 
9   J. Wilson and C. Jones, “An Analysis of the S&P 500 Index and Cowles’s Extensions: Price Indexes 
and Stock Returns, 1870–1999”,  Journal of Business, (2002), 75 n°3, pp. 505-33. For a better index than 
the Cowles one, see W. Goetzmann, R. Ibbotson and C. Peng. “A New Historical Database for the NYSE 
1815 to 1925: Performance and Predictability”, The Journal of Financial Markets, 4, no. 1 (2000), pp. 1-
32. 
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today’s indices, were frequently not present in older indices, which may explain a significant 
difference in their outcomes. 
The first major result of this article is to provide new estimates of the long term returns that holders of 
such a portfolio of French stocks obtained. We show that the price index (without dividends) didn’t 
protect its owners against inflation. Its real performance was positive up until 1914 (in a period of 
stable prices) but it was substantially negative for the 20th century in spite of the rapid growth of stock 
prices since the 1980s.  
When one turns to total return (including the dividend yield, supposedly tax-exempted), the 
performance is substantial from 1854 to1914 (more than 5 per cent yearly total return net of inflation), 
but very low for the 20th century as a whole. Since 1914, gold has proved to be a better investment 
than stocks. 
These results contrast strongly with those of Arbulu and Gallais-Hamonno, who link the official 20th 
century indices to similarly constructed new indices for the 19th century and form the basis for French 
investment performance in the Dimson-Marsh-Staunton synthesis10. We show that the reason for the 
divergence rests on the methodology adopted by Arbulu and the official indices, which suffer both 
survivor bias and weighting problems. In particular, they don’t weigh the stocks by capitalization, 
consequently giving much higher implicit weights to small caps, leading to a seriously overvalued 
index in the long run.  
Contrasting with the well-known results for the US, the low equity premium that we observe in France 
is in line with most models of risk aversion11. We then suggest that if our revisionist approach of 
French indices can be extended to other European markets, the equity premium puzzle may disappear 
                                                 
10   P. Arbulu, Le marché parisien des actions au XIXème siècle : performance et efficience d’un marché 
émergent, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, (University of Orléans, 1998) ; G. Gallais-Hamonno and P. Arbulu. 
“La rentabilité réelle des actifs boursiers de 1950 à 1992”, Economie et Statistique,  no. 281 (1995) pp. 3-
30.  
11  For the US, see for example R.R. Ibbotson and R. A. Sinquefield. “Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation: 
Simulations of the Future 1976-2000”, Journal of Business, 49, no. 3 (1976), pp. 11-47;  or J. Siegel, 
“The Equity Premium: Stock and Bond Returns since 1802”, Financial Analysts Journal, 48; no.1 (1992), 
pp. 28-38.  
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in many of the cases discussed for example by Barro, and end up (as some earlier studies already 
argued) as a mostly US phenomenon12. 
Finally, we argue that the evolution of the CAC-40 in the twentieth century can be understood as the 
result of the wars and the inflationary periods, suggesting that the impact of major wars on private 
wealth has been underestimated up until now. The first section presents in detail the methodology of 
our index. Differences between earlier indices and ours are discussed and some robustness checks 
made in the next one. We then present the main results and the main changes in policy regimes that 
may explain the index performance in the long run, and conclude. 
 
                                                 
12   R.J. Barro, "Rare Disasters and Assets Markets in the Twentieth Century”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 121, no. 3 (2006), pp. 823-66. 
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I METHODOLOGY: A WEIGHTED BLUE CHIPS INDEX ALONG THE LINES OF THE CAC40 
 
The aim of this section is to detail the methodology we used to build the new index. In the very long 
run, even details matter, since any error is magnified by the effect of compounded interest. The index 
concentrates on stocks of French firms; not because French investors held only French stocks (they 
actually held many foreign ones, especially up until World War One13), but because focusing on 
national securities is the first step generally used before considering the effects of international 
diversification, which could be measured using various foreign indices.  
The procedure we use can be summarized as follows. The prices, dividends and number of shares are 
collected for all French stocks listed on the Paris official stock exchange for the first Friday of each 
year. Capitalizations are calculated for that date. We then take the 40 highest capitalizations for 
inclusion in the index for the following year, with two exceptions: when various securities of the same 
firm are listed, we only consider the one with the highest capitalization; we also exclude firms with 
less than 10.000 shares. For the 40 firms in the index, we gather monthly prices and calculate the 
market index by weighting these prices with market capitalizations, in order to make it reflect the 
actual market)14.  
 
We chose to build a blue chips index because the most important shares it includes are precisely those 
held by most investors15. Small firms were usually heavily dominated by family owners as in most 
continental Europe16; their shares were sometimes listed in spite of being closely held because no 
constraint on minimum free float existed. This led these stocks to be illiquid, which was a major 
                                                 
13   Ch.-A. Michalet, Les placements des épargnants français de 1815 à nos jours (Paris, 1968). 
14  Free float would in theory be a superior alternative, but the amount of the free float cannot be 
reconstituted until that information started to be published in 2003 for Euronext’s CAC40. 
15    A. Daumard (ed.) Les fortunes privées au XIXe siècle, Paris, Mouton, 1973, provides information on 
portfolios held at death.  
16   See e.g. F. Barça and M. Becht (eds), The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford, 2001); or A. D. 
Chandler, Scale and Scope, the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Ma., 1990). British 
corporations may have had a more diversified ownership, see J. Franks, C. Mayer and St. Rossi, 
“Ownership: Evolution and Regulation”, Review of Financial Studies, 22 (October 2009), pp. 4009-4056. 
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concern for ordinary investors (and led financial advisors to recommend avoiding them17). Family 
control could also lead to agency problems and price manipulation, also threatening ordinary 
investors. Furthermore, both low liquidity and price deviations are also a problem for the building of 
an index and its interpretation18. So the restriction to blue chips should help our index to represent the 
behaviour of investors better19 and to avoid including significant liquidity or risk premia, so that the 
long term decline in returns could not be misinterpreted20. These reasons explain the dominance of 
blue chips indices in financial analysis today. 
Our index concentrates on French firms, which are defined by their legal status, not by the place they 
have their activity: the Suez and the first Panama canals are French firms. So are French subsidiaries 
of foreign firms such as Thomson-Houston. We consider for inclusion firms listed on all French 
exchanges. In practice, almost all blue chips listed on the official Paris Bourse, but there were a few 
exceptions, such as some Northern France coal mines that listed in Lille up to the early 1920s.  
Diversification is usually considered as sufficient to eliminate specific risk when the number of stocks 
in a portfolio reaches thirty21. For an index weighted by stock market capitalizations, a somewhat 
higher number is better. We chose forty stocks in order to satisfy these requirements and to facilitate 
the linkage with today’s CAC 40, the major Euronext-Paris index. It might be argued that the number 
of stocks included should increase with time and the development of the stock market. Actually, the 
Paris stock exchange was well developed (in terms for example of market capitalization to GDP) quite 
                                                 
17   P. Leroy-Beaulieu,  L'art de placer et gérer sa fortune (Paris, 1906). 
18   E. Dimson and P. Marsh. “The Stability of UK Risk Measures and the Problem of Thin Trading” 
Journal of Finance, 38, no. 3 (1983), pp. 753-83. 
19  A recent study of the individual accounts at a US stock broker in the 1990s finds an average portfolio of 
only four stocks, see B. Barber and T. Odean, “Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common 
Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors”, Journal of Finance, vol.55, n°2 (2000), pp. 773-
806.  
 
20   A. Ben-Rephael, O. Kadan, and A. Wohl. “The Diminishing Liquidity Premium”, Working paper 
presented to the NBER workshop on financial microstructures, 2008. 
21   M. Statman, “How many stocks make a diversified portfolio”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, vol. 22, n°3 (1987), pp. 353-63. 
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early, and suffered a decline during the 20th century from which it recovered only in the last 30 years22: 
as shown in Table 1, the proportion of our 40 firms in total market capitalization varied a lot, and with 
only a weak declining trend. It has also always been very high. These reasons – and the search for 
simplicity – led us to hold constant the number of firms in our index. 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
The list of the stocks included in the index is fixed following a stable, simple and transparent formula 
in order to avoid ex-post insight. This requires us to avoid today’s practice of choosing the stocks 
composing the CAC-40 among the 100 biggest capitalizations listed in Euronext-Paris, with the help 
of a scientific committee that we cannot reinvent for previous periods. We therefore include more 
simply the 40 stocks with the biggest capitalizations, and we rebalance the portfolio each year at the 
beginning of the year. The yearly rebalancing of the portfolio allows us to eliminate the survivor bias 
that affects many retrospective studies of stock prices. This is all the more important since a number of 
major firms failed during the period under study, and should not be excluded23. 
We added two minor criteria to the capitalization for the selection of stocks included in the index. The 
first one is a liquidity criterion: we decided to exclude from the index all firms with less than 10,000 
shares. The reasons for this choice can be traced to the functioning of the 19th Paris Bourse, which 
sometimes listed stocks without wondering about the potential for an active market24. This was the 
case for some firms with a very small number of shares, especially insurance companies whose 
statutes frequently even required the agreement of their Board for any stock transaction to be valid. 
We chose a low number, as 10,000 corresponds to one fourth of the average number of shares of all 
the firms listed on the market in 1853, the last year for which the number of firms satisfying the 
requirements for inclusion in the index is below 40 (the reason we start the index in 1854). In any 
                                                 
22  R. Rajan and L. Zingales. “The Great Reversal: the Politics of Financial Development in the 20th 
Century”, Journal of Financial Economics, 69, no.1 (2003), pp. 5-50. 
23  Early cases are Crédit mobilier (1867), Union Générale (1882), Comptoir d’Escompte de Paris, Société 
Industrielle des Métaux and the Panama canal (1889). More recent “quasi-bankruptcies” are Eurotunnel, 
Eurodisneyland, or Crédit Foncier de France.  
24  P.-C. Hautcoeur, (ed.), Le marché financier français au 19e siècle, Récit, (Paris, 2007); see A. Courtois, 
Des opérations de bourse, (Paris, 1855), for an early and frequently reprinted publication on listed firms.  
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case, that liquidity constraint only excludes a small number of firms and only during a short period, so 
that it cannot significantly affect the long term performance of the index25. 
Our last criterion is the limitation to one category of stock per firm for inclusion in the index. Firms 
frequently had various categories of shares, especially in the 19th century: preference shares were less 
widespread than in the U.S., but the relationship between ordinary and other shares was sometime 
similar to that between ordinary and preference shares in the US. For example, actions de jouissance 
(enjoyment shares) were shares whose nominal value had been reimbursed (something frequent in the 
period, and even statutory in many firms whose activity depended on terminable concessions from the 
government, typically in railroads, electricity distribution and other utilities); this gave them no right 
to the “interest” part of the dividend on ordinary shares (usually 5 per cent of the nominal value), but a 
right to the “superdividend” above that “interest”. Parts de fondateurs (founders’ shares) were special 
shares, which were usually given to the firms’ founders and gave them a right to a fixed portion of the 
total payments of “superdividend” to all other shareholders. Shares with multiple votes became 
frequent in the 1920s and were prohibited by law at the end of that decade26. Since the rights to 
dividends of these various shares differ, their prices don’t move identically (the prices of founders’ 
shares and enjoyment shares are more volatile). Usually, founders’ shares are quite closely held and 
would not qualify for the previous criteria; enjoyment shares increase in numbers and can become 
dominant in the long run for some firms.  
We measure the capitalization of each category and include in the index only the one with the highest 
capitalization (which proves to be almost always the ordinary shares). Another solution would be to 
add-up the various categories into a single one or to include all categories satisfying the previous 
criteria. We decided on our rule for three reasons. Firstly, it is used today by Euronext for the 
                                                 
25  The only well-known firm that is excluded during a period because of that requirement is Saint Gobain, 
which is number 34 by capitalization in 1858 (a rank that increases later) but with only 4,364 shares (each 
priced at 33,000 francs, or some 100,000 euros in today’s money). One insurance company excluded up 
until the 1860s is Assurances Nationales Incendie (only 2,000 shares,). 
26  For more details, see P.-C. Hautcoeur, “Asymétries d'information, coûts de mandat et financement des 
entreprises françaises (1890-1936)”, Revue Economique, 50, no. 5 (1999), pp. 1053-87. 
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calculation of the CAC-4027. Secondly, the addition of all categories into a single capitalization would 
create biases, since the rights on the profits of the various shares were usually different, as were their 
risks, justifying differences in prices and in price variations among them. Lastly, our rule is likely to 
reflect the behaviour of investors, who probably, and with good reason, did not consider the holding of 
different securities in the same firm as useful diversification. In any case, this rule mostly affects a few 
railroads’ actions de jouissance in the 19th century, and the Suez Canal in the interwar period. The year 
most affected is 1936, in which the activity and share price of the Canal were recovering while the 
French market suffered overall decline. During that year, not only were the ordinary shares of the 
Canal the first (by far) capitalization of the Paris Bourse, but its other shares represented more than the 
second and the third capitalizations put together (Table 2). Nevertheless, giving the Suez canal a 
weight in the index similar to that of all its shares in the capitalization would probably make the index 
too dependent on a single firm (at the peak, its ordinary shares represented 22.93 per cent of the CAC, 
and the total of its shares as much as 32.02 per cent).28  
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
The prices used for the index are all transaction prices. On the Paris stock exchange, prices were set up 
until 1986 thanks to Walras-style auctioneers who gathered demands and offers for every stock and 
determined an equilibrium price (the fixing price) in a centralized manner at a fixed moment in the 
morning. Other prices could be quoted later in the day if transactions were sufficiently important. We 
chose to use the last price of the day for our index because some of the periodicals we used only 
mentioned that price.  
The index is calculated using various periodicals, among which the most important is the official list 
price of the Paris Bourse, the Cote Officielle. We use a few other journals in order to complete for 
missing issues, incomplete data and for the shares that were not traded on the official market but on 
                                                 
27  The very existence of this rule probably modifies the behaviour of today’s firms, making them eliminate 
special shares to improve the likelihood of access to the CAC-40 and the visibility that would give them. 
This was not the case in the past, but we still prefer to maintain that rule for the sake of continuity. 
28  Furthermore, this exclusion balances the fact than 40 per cent of the capital of Suez was owned by the 
British government and thus, not free float. 
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the unofficial Coulisse29 or on provincial exchanges instead. The first step was to collect for the first 
Friday of every January the name, last price, nominal value, paid value, number of shares and 
dividends for every share mentioned in our sources (a number which varied from 100 to more than 
600 during our period30). This first collection allowed us to calculate the capitalization of all important 
listed shares, and then to select the 40 most important ones. The second step consisted in collecting 
monthly prices for these 40 stocks for the first Friday of each month31.  
Within each year, our index is calculated using individual stock prices weighted by their capitalization, 
from January to January. Monthly returns are calculated as : 
 
 
Where the numbers of shares are constant within each year. 
Components are modified every January, using the new capitalization data and each year’s index is 
chained to the next one using January’s value as a basis. This index is based on the value of the 
official CAC-40 index when it was created on December 31st, 1987, which was taken as 1000.  
Some technical choices were made, which we believe have no lasting impact on the level of the index. 
First, when a price was missing, the previous listed price was used. This happens rather frequently in 
the 19th century when repeated prices represent almost 16 per cent of the total, compared to only 4.5 
per cent after 1914. Nevertheless, the impact should be limited because missing prices concerned 
mostly the smallest stocks in the sample (they represent only 2.6 per cent of the prices of the biggest 
                                                 
29  The Coulisse, or “marché en banque” was developed outside the regulated Bourse during the 19th 
century. It was partly legalized from 1893 on. See P.-C. Hautcoeur and A. Riva, “The Paris Financial 
Market in the 19th Century : An Efficient Multi-Polar Organization ?”,Working Paper, 2007 no.31, Paris 
School of Economics and E. Pollin,“La Coulisse”, in Gallais-Hamonno, Georges (ed.), Le marché 
financier français au 19e siècle, Aspects quantitatifs des acteurs et des instruments à la Bourse de Paris, 
(Paris, 2007).  
30  These counts may not be exhaustive since some more shares could be traded on the Coulisse, provincial 
Bourses or OTC markets without being mentioned in journals, but they were marginal and could not 
modify our results, in particular the list of the forty major stocks. 
31  Friday was chosen because it does not correspond to settlement periods (forward operations were settled 
every 15 days or every month depending on the moment during our period), and because weekly 
periodicals, usually published on Saturday, gave Friday prices.  
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capitalization in the index, compared to 16.4 per cent for the smallest). The ten biggest capitalizations, 
which weigh 61 per cent of the index on average, have only 3.88 per cent missing prices. Although 
one may consider these proportions as high, they are standard in historical finance (e.g. Goetzman & 
al. 2000), and they actually are a major reason for calculating blue chip indices rather than 
comprehensive ones. Most importantly, we don’t think that our choice has any impact on our index’s 
long term performance. 
Second choice: although the precise date at which dividends are paid have a short term impact on 
equity prices payments, we don’t adjust prices for that effect. First, because precise payments’ dates 
are frequently not mentioned in our sources. Second, most importantly, because our aim is to measure 
long term changes in prices, which are certainly not affected. For the same reason, we make no 
adjustment for capital changes (except for stock splits, for which prices were adjusted) or for firms 
appearing or disappearing during the year (IPOs, mergers, nationalisations, bankruptcies). Firms 
appearing during the year and big enough to be admitted in the CAC-40 are included the next January. 
Firms disappearing are maintained up to the next January with the last price being used all months to 
that date (these repeated prices are included in those mentioned above). All these assumptions 
artificially weakly decrease the within-year volatility, but don’t affect year to year changes in the 
index (at least as suggested by a check on the 1987-1997 period discussed in more detail below). 
Furthermore, these choices affect a limited number of prices, making it unlikely that the index is 
significantly modified. 
That methodology is the one followed in order to build the pure price index. From the same sources we 
compute the return from dividends at the beginning of each year, which is added to the price index in 
order to build an index for total return. Below, whenever an index is mentioned without mention of 
dividends or total return, we mean the pure price index. 
 
II COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS INDICES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
Comparison 
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Figure 1 compares our index to the main existing indices which are usually linked to cover the whole 
period32, and which we jointly call the Arbulu-SGF-INSEE index, with a common basis in 1854=108. 
Table 3 provides evidence that these differences were statistically significant for the periods covered 
by the three different authors. The discrepancies are enormous, but also surprisingly easy to explain.  
FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
The Arbulu-SGF-INSEE index links an index built by Arbulu for the 1802-1913 period to those built 
at the time by Statistique Générale de la France (SGF), the official statistical office, and later by its 
successor INSEE. This index – or part of it – has been used by all recent studies on the long run 
performance of the Paris stock exchange, mostly due to lack of alternatives and because of the 
inclusion of its most official parts in official publications33. 
The index built by SGF in the interwar period – as well as those of many other statistical institutions at 
the time – did not aim to measure the performance of a portfolio of stocks but rather to observe or 
anticipate fluctuations in macroeconomic activity34. For that reason, it did not focus on long term level 
change. In order not to miss any impending crisis or recovery, industry indices included as many firms 
as possible, all of them on an equal basis since they all could equally signal down- or upturns. The 
aggregate index was weighted by industry capitalization but was based on these un-weighted industry 
                                                 
32  P-C Hautcoeur and M. Petit. “The Development of the Paris Bourse in the Interwar Period What Old and 
New Stock Indices tell us”, Working paper Delta 2004 no.18; M. Petit, “Inventaire des séries de données 
historiques du projet Old Paris Stock Exchange 1919-1939”, Economies et Sociétés, 40, no. 8 (2006): 
1089-119, provide an original index for the interwar period, with a methodology similar to ours. It 
includes 30 blue chips, with a slightly more conservative selection procedure since shares are chosen only 
if they remain at least 4 years among the biggest capitalizations of the Bourse. This may explain why it 
features somewhat more fluctuations.  
33  Gallais-Hamonno and Arbulu, “Rentabilité réelle”; P. Jorion and W. Goetzmann. “Global Stock Market 
in the 20th Century”, The Journal of Finance 54; no. 3 (1999), pp. 953-80;  Dimson & alii, Triumph of 
the Optimists; Société des Nations. Annuaire statistique de la société des nations (Geneva, 1939). 
34  Hautcoeur, “Why and How to Measure”. 
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indices. This method was maintained with little change by INSEE after 194535. It was also the method 
used retrospectively by Arbulu36. 
The upward bias stemming from broad un-weighted indices can be enormous, as one example will 
show. In 1963, Rhône-Poulenc was the most important French listed firm, with a market capitalization 
of 5.21 billion francs, or 4.6 per cent of a total market capitalization of 112 billion37. Within our CAC-
40 index, Rhône-Poulenc’s weight is 10.35 per cent, since the total capitalization of the 40 first shares 
is 50 billion. In the SGF-INSEE methodology, Rhône-Poulenc is one among 22 firms in the Produits 
chimiques, électro-métallurgie et verreries group (mostly chemicals), whose weight is 15.6 per cent in 
the official index. The impact of Rhône-Poulenc shares is then 15.6/22 or 0.71 per cent, compared to 
its 10.35 per cent in our index. At the other end of the spectrum, Cotelle et Foucher – Javel La Croix, a 
chemicals firm with a capitalization of 74 million francs (or 0.066 per cent of the market, 70 times less 
than Rhône-Poulenc) also weighed 0.71 per cent in the index. Table 4 provides a measure for the 
chemicals industry in 1963 of the discrepancies between the weights in the index and those in the 
capitalization, showing that the overrepresentation of small firms was a general phenomenon, and one 
that could affect the index enormously. If, as we now know, the performance of smaller firms is on 
average superior to that of bigger ones, this overrepresentation of small firms creates an upward bias 
in the index38. For example, if the average difference in performance between firms included in our 
CAC-40 and the others is 1 per cent a year, and the CAC-40 includes only a tenth of the firms 
included in the SGF-INSEE index, that index should outperform the CAC-40 by almost 1 per cent a 
year. 
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
                                                 
35   INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques). Etudes Statistiques, Supplément 
trimestriel du Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique, (Paris, PUF), January-March 1963. 
36   Arbulu, Marché parisien des actions, 1998, p. 132; P. Arbulu, P. « le marché parisien des actions au 
XIXe siècle », in Georges Gallais-Hamonno (ed.), Le marché financier français au XIXe siècle, aspects 
quantitatifs (Paris, 2007), pp.  365-457, p. 424. 
37  INSEE, Etudes Statistiques, p. 79. 
38  E. Fama, and K. R. French. “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns”, The Journal of Finance, 47, 
no. 2 (1992), pp. 427-65; J. Hamon and B. Jacquillat. Le marché français des actions, (Paris, 1992). 
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Other choices also cause substantial biases in the existing index. Arbulu’s calculations suffer 
substantial survivor bias, since he chooses the shares to be included partly on the basis of their 
stability, more precisely he eliminates all shares which didn’t remain listed at least five years, which 
makes him omit the Union générale (6th capitalization by size in 1882, 5.51 per cent of our CAC-40, 
failed in 1882) or the Panama canal (9th capitalization in 1884, also soon failed), and the substantial 
downward impact of their failure on contemporary portfolios and attitudes towards stock investment39. 
A major flaw of the official indices built by INSEE after SGF is their treatment of nationalizations. 
Nationalized firms are excluded ex-post. They represented an enormous proportion of listed firms and 
even more of our CAC-40, since they included all the railroads in 1937, and all the electricity, gas, 
coal, bank and insurance industries in 1945. We could not find details on how the SGF calculated the 
impact of 1936-37 nationalizations. Concerning the 1944-45 nationalizations, which represented 28 
per cent of early 1939 CAC-40 capitalization, the official index excludes the firms concerned from 
1939 on40, which leads to a important divergence between that index and one that would include them, 
as reported by INSEE insiders somewhat later41 (table 5).  
TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
In our own index, we treat nationalizations using the same rules as for other firms exiting the index. 
When a firm is nationalized and stops being listed, we retain the last quoted prices for the rest of the 
year and don’t try to introduce non-market prices (such as the compensations paid by the government).  
The main banks are nationalized by the law of December 2, 1945, with application on January 1st, 
1946; as a result there are no missing prices. In the gas and electricity industries, only one firm still 
belonged to our index in January 1946, in spite of the fact that the nationalization project was only 
presented in March 1946. This suggests that the market clearly anticipated these nationalizations, 
which were mentioned in the program of the Conseil National de la Résistance of March, 1944. The 
nationalization of coal mines was announced on December 14th, 1944 (with no details on 
                                                 
39    On the psychological traits and consequences of the 1882 crash, see E. Zola, L’Argent (Paris, 1891). 
40   INSEE, Le mouvement économique en France de 1938 à 1948 (Paris, 1950), p. 162. 
41   P. Laforest and P. Sallee. “Le pouvoir d’achat des actions, des obligations et de l’or”, Economie et 
Statistiques, (1969), n. 3, pp. 3-12. 
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compensations); their stocks remained listed in 1945 but their prices decreased quickly, so that none 
belonged to the CAC-40 in January, 1945. Finally, no insurance firm was large enough to enter the 
CAC-40. Nationalized firms then disappeared progressively from the CAC-40 as they disappeared 
from the portfolios of investors, who turned to other stocks. Our methodology mimics that behaviour 
just by maintaining consistently its own rules. It is likely that it underestimates the negative impact of 
nationalizations on the portfolios of their holders since in some cases, the government blocked the 
shareholders’ investments during a long (highly inflationary) period before they obtained 
compensation that could be sold and reinvested in other shares, when we assume this was done at the 
end of the year when the last price was quoted. 
Unsurprisingly, that period is the one with most divergences between our CAC-40 and the official 
index. 
We conclude that the methodology of the existing Arbulu-SGF-INSEE index makes it greatly 
inadequate in order to measure the actual performance that could be obtained by investors, and that 
using it in that purpose would lead to a severe overestimation of that performance42.  We synthesize 
them in table 6. 
TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
 
Robustness checks 
Given the enormous difference between the traditional index and ours, one might reasonably ask for 
more robustness checks than just identifying the biases in the older index. A direct way to validate our 
own methodology is to compare it to the true CAC-40. We did so for the first decade of its existence 
(1987-97). Both indices are highly correlated, as can be seen in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
Nevertheless, our own index performs slightly worse than Euronext’s (7.5 percent less growth over 10 
years, compared to a global rise of 185 per cent, or a 4 per cent difference). This difference is 
statistically not significant: tests do not reject the hypothesis of identical means, variances, skewness, 
                                                 
42  A comparison of the performances of our CAC-40 and the SGF-INSEE-Arbulu index shows that the 
latter significantly over-performed the former in all decades but one since 1854. 
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kurtosis or distribution43. If it were, it would probably result from the choices in Euronext’s selection 
method, that allowed smaller or more dynamic firms to be included, compared to our automatic 
selection method. In any case, that divergence is small compared to the one we observed between the 
Arbulu-SGF-INSEE index and our own. 
We also use this period to distinguish the consequences of our selection method (strictly 40 first 
capitalizations) and our simplifying assumptions (rebalancing of the selection only once a year, no 
treatment within the year of mergers, nationalization or failure, little correction for some capital 
modifications). For that purpose, we calculate another index, CAC3, which is composed as the 
authentic one at the start of each year, but not recomposed during the year, and to which we apply our 
simplifying assumptions.  
TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
Table 7 shows that – contrary to our index – this index performs better than the authentic CAC-40, 
suggesting that sample selection is the major cause of the negative difference between our index and 
the official one, and that our simplifying technical assumptions per se would more probably bias the 
index upward – if there is a bias. This would then mainly reinforce our conclusions. 
The official CAC-40 also presents an assumption that we did not apply to our historical 
reconstruction: it imposes a 15 per cent maximum on the weight of any stock. Our historical data 
(Figure 3) show that the share of the biggest firm (even when restricted to its most important share, as 
described above) varies heavily, and that this 15 per cent ceiling was bypassed in 21 years of our 
sample. But recalculating our index with a 15 per cent ceiling showed no significant impact. Since 
such an assumption has little theoretical support, we preferred to retain our unlimited index.  
FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE 
Another robustness check considers the impact of the number of stocks included in the index. As we 
explained above, we chose a blue chips index in order to correspond to the behaviour of most investors 
                                                 
43   Formal tests of the official CAC-40 and ours being identical between 1988 and 1997 gives the following 
results: for equal kurtosis 124.46 (< 144.35 as X2 critical value at 5 per cent); for equal skewness 20.88 (< 
144.35 as X2 critical value at 5 per cent); for equal distributions 20.45 (<36.41 as X2 critical value 5 per 
cent). 
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and to maximize the data quality. We chose 40 stocks for continuity with today’s CAC-40 and because 
we considered 40 as a sufficient number for diversification purposes. Somewhat higher numbers 
would also be consistent with this rationale, but not necessary; broadening the index to 50 stocks 
would not change much, in any case, because the marginal stocks have very small capitalizations 
compared to the first 40. Figure 4 shows that the weight of the last 10 stocks included in the CAC-40 
is 8 per cent on average between 1854 and 2006, the weight of the 40th one being 0.69 per cent on 
average. Adding a few more stocks would probably have little effect on the index. Admittedly, a 
constant number of stocks in the index implies a varying weight of the CAC-40 firms within total 
market capitalization of Paris-listed stocks, but as we mentioned earlier, this variation has no trend. 
We consider this is not as important an issue as the standard diversification behaviour of investors.  
FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE 
A last robustness check is provided by the calculation of an equally-weighted index based on the same 
sample as ours. Unsurprisingly, the performance of the equally-weighted index, which over-weights 
the (relatively) small firms in the index, is better than that of our capitalization-weighted index (table 
8). This confirms the importance of a strict selection method and of the frequent adjustments in sample 
and weights.  
TABLE 8 AROUND HERE 
 
III RESULTS 
 
Nominal performance 
Table 9 summarizes the price variations, dividend yields and total nominal return of the CAC-40 from 
1854 to 2006 and for various sub-periods (the choice of which we explain below). Over the whole 
period, total nominal return was 8.02 per cent (arithmetic mean), from which the dividend yield 
represented 3.84 per cent per year, almost as much as capital gains  –price variations in the index – 
which attained 4.18 per cent per year on average. If we exclude the 1914-1950 “wars” period for the 
moment, total nominal return increased from 5.55 per cent before 1914 to 7.28 per cent from 1951 to 
1982 and a record 15.98 per cent from 1983 to 2006.  
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TABLE 9 AROUND HERE 
Over the period, the relative contributions of dividends and capital gains varied substantially. Their 
relative volatilities were also very different. Capital gains almost permanently increased, from a very 
low level of 1.11 per cent per year before 1914 to 2.8 per cent in the interwar period, 3.63 per cent 
from 1951 to 1982 and 12.83 per cent in the recent 1983-2006 period. It is not surprising, then, that 
dividends represented a decreasing proportion of total return. While dividend yields averaged 4.52 per 
cent before World War 1 (more than 80 per cent of total return), they decreased to 3.87 per cent in the 
interwar period, 3.64 per cent from 1951 to 1982 and 3.15 per cent from 1983 to 2006. 
Unsurprisingly, prices were much more volatile than dividends with respective standard deviations of 
19.12 per cent and 1.39 per cent for the whole period. The volatility of the pure-price index increased 
from a low 7.32 per cent before 1914 to 20.88 per cent in the interwar period and around 24 per cent 
after 1950. 
World War 1 appears as a rupture in volatility series (Figure 5). After a long period of decreasing 
volatility from 1854 to 1914, it increased sharply and remained high throughout the 20th century. On 
average, standard deviation almost tripled from the 19th century to the 20th. A chi-squared test 
comparing the distribution of monthly variations for 1854-1913 and the same number of months after 
1914 clearly rejects the hypothesis of identical distributions44. This much higher volatility could be 
interpreted as the sign of a high inflation risk, although its persistence in the most recent period 
suggests another explanation may be necessary. 
FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE 
The volatility of dividends was much lower and stable, with a standard deviation below 2 per cent 
during all sub-periods. Actually, dividend smoothing was probably a standard practice in the short run, 
as can be seen in Figure 6, where most of the short run changes in dividend yield can be accounted for 
by variations in stock prices rather than by autonomous changes in dividends.  
FIGURE 6 AROUND HERE 
                                                 
44  This test does not suppose a Gaussian distribution (see below): we distribute the variations in classes by 
quarter of standard deviation, which allows us to compare the distributions directly.  
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Overall, the decreasing importance of dividends is consistent with the change of dividend behaviour 
that has been documented in various countries for the period around the First World War. It can be 
interpreted as a tax optimization choice, since in many countries (including France) the taxation of 
dividends increased substantially during that period compared to that of capital gains. It can also result 
from changes in corporate governance and investment strategies, especially the emergence of modern 
corporations in which shareholders were marginalized by managers and profits were increasingly 
reinvested45.  
Up to now, our results are more or less in line with the standard history of stock prices, in which the 
most significant changes are the acceleration of capital gains and the relative decrease of dividends in 
the 20th century, in relation to the emergence of general inflation in that period. What is most specific 
to France is the real performance, once that inflation is taken into account. 
 
Real performance: wars or policy regime changes? 
The real long term performance of the CAC-40 index (without dividends) was significantly negative 
from 1854 to 2006: with on average a 4.18 per cent increase, the CAC-40 was far from the average 
inflation of 5.64 per cent (see figure 7 and table 10, section A). Real returns actually reflect mostly the 
impact of inflation: they were slightly positive (0.7 per cent per year) before 1914, negative from 1914 
to 1982 (-7.4 per cent per year) and again positive since 1983 (10.42 per cent on average). 
FIGURE 7 AND TABLE 10 AROUND HERE 
To our knowledge, a negative return for such a long period is unique to the French market. One may 
wonder whether the problems lie in the consumer price indices we used. We don’t think so, for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, French price indices were developed since the late 19th century by high-
                                                 
45   A.A. Berle, and G. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York, 1932); A. D. 
Chandler, The Visible Hand, The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 1977). J. 
Rutterford, “From Dividend Yield to Discounted Cash Flows: a History of U.K. and U.S. Equity 
Valuation Techniques”, Accounting, Business and Financial History, 14, no. 2 (2004), pp. 115-49 
suggests the dividend was long the major information on stock value, hence high dividend yields as a 
proportion of total returns. W. Goetzmann, “Patterns in three centuries of stock market data”, Journal of 
Business, 66, no. 2 (1993), pp. 249-70, observes the same pattern on various markets. 
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quality and up-to-date statisticians involved in international methodological discussions, so there is no 
reason for French indices to be more upward-biased than those of other countries46. Secondly, contrary 
to stock market indices, they have been checked for consistency with other macroeconomic variables 
for decades47. Thirdly, biases could also be downward, since underestimates during periods of price 
controls (wars in particular, but for some products in France up to the 1980s) may not have been 
corrected in the later periods. Fourthly, the underestimation of quality changes, which is the most-
argued reason for upward biases in consumer price indices, is likely to be more important in low 
inflation and service-dominated economies such as the French one in the recent period, precisely the 
only one during which the real performances of the stock market are high. 
One may argue that a correct measure must include the reinvestment of dividends to appreciate the 
total return. On that account, the average total real return from 1854 to 2006 was only 3.05 per cent, 
far from the 8.3 per cent observed for US stocks48. Furthermore, this performance was not constant 
over time. A clear regime change appeared with World War One. From 1854 to 1913, the CAC-40 
holder who reinvested all his dividends earned a 5.39 per cent yearly real total return, slightly below 
the 5.58 per cent nominal one, when from 1914 to 2006, the nominal total return increased to 9.61 per 
cent, but real total return decreased to 1.53 per cent (and a negative –1,26 per cent in geometric mean). 
These period to period changes are all statistically highly significant, and the radical departure from 
19th century metallic standards and price stability with the start of World War One makes it 
unnecessary to use technical tools to identify the watershed date. One must conclude that investment 
in French equities just protected wealth against inflation during that period, even when reinvesting all 
dividends, something which has been observed in other countries, but never for such a long period49. 
                                                 
46   A. Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers. A History of Statistical Reasoning (Cambridge, Ma., 
1998) (first publication in French, Paris, 1993). 
47   M. Lévy-Leboyer and F. Bourguignon, L'économie française au XIXe siècle, (Paris, 1985) (Engl. trans. 
Cambridge, 1990) ; P. Villa, Une analyse macroéconomique de la France au XXe siècle, Paris, CNRS, 
1993. 
48 J. Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run: a Guide to Selecting Markets for Long-Term Growth (New York, 
1994). 
49 The literature on the relationships between stock real returns and inflation is huge. It frequently finds 
some negative correlation for the short run, but not in the long run. See J. Boudoukh and M. Richardson. 
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The literature has already highlighted the negative impact of the wars on the returns on equity 
investments50, but has never found it as important and long-lasting as we do. In order to distinguish the 
immediate impact of the wars from more lasting impact on returns, sections F and H of table 10 
measure the impact of both wars when including in the “war period” the years until GDP returned to 
its pre-war level (1922 after World War One, 1950 after World War Two). The total yearly  returns of 
the CAC-40 during these two war periods are particularly bad, below –10 per cent in both cases in real 
terms, in particular because of high average inflation rates (during World War Two, dividends were 
legally capped, which may have contributed to low returns). A broader view, in line with the 
characterization (by no less than Winston Churchill) of the whole 1914-1945 period as the “Second 
Thirty Years War”51, suggests that we consider the entire 1914-1950 period as one of war and 
reconstruction, in which low returns were the price paid by wealth owners for the destruction and costs 
of the wars. That perspective fits well with our data, which show that the yearly real total return of the 
CAC-40 was hardly positive during the 1923-1939 period (a consequence of some remaining inflation 
in the mid-1920s, of the Great Depression, and of renewed inflation in the run-up to the war from 1936 
onward).  
We could then consider that the “normal period” only resumed in 1951. Does this period represent a 
comeback to the sort of performances the French financial market provided before World War One? 
The answer to that question is not straightforward, as can be inferred from Figure 8. On the one hand, 
                                                                                                                                                        
“Stock Returns and Inflation: A Long-Horizon Perspective”, American Economic Review, 83 no. 1 
(1993), pp. 1346-55; R. Geske and R. Roll. “The Fiscal and Monetary Linkage Between Stock Returns 
and Inflation”, Journal of Finance, 38, n°1 (1983), pp. 1-33, E. Fama “Stocks returns, Real Activity, 
Inflation and Money”, The American Economic Review, 71, no. 4 (1981), pp. 545-65;  D. P. Ely and K. J. 
Robinson. “The Stock Market and Inflation: A Synthesis of the Theory and Evidence”, Economic Review, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, March (1989), pp. 17-29; Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run, p. 158; W. 
Sharpe, A. Gordon, and J. Bailey. Investments, (Englewood Cliffs, 1999), p. 137; Ibbotson Associates. 
“Annual Stock Return and Rates of Inflation, 1926-1996”, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 1997 
Yearbook, Chicago: Ibbotson Associates, 1997. 
50   E. Dimson, P. Marsh and M. Staunton, “Irrational Optimism”, Financial Analysts Journal, 60, no. 1 
(2004), pp. 15-25. 
51  P. Temin, “The Transmission of the Great Depression”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, no. 2 
(1993), pp. 87-102, p. 88. 
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the 1951-2006 period considered as a whole presents very similar returns to those of the pre-1914 
period (6.38 per cent yearly real total return between 1951 and 2006, compared to 5.39 per cent, see 
table 10), even if volatility remains much higher (24.64 per cent compared to 8.86 per cent before 
1914 for standard deviation of real returns). On the other hand, this period is quite heterogeneous 
according to many criteria.  
FIGURE 8 AROUND HERE 
A first one – a major one for our subject – is inflation. If one wonders when the long inflationary 
experience that started in 1914 ended, two dates stand out as worth investigating. The first is 1958, 
when France established a new Republic, adopted a convertible currency under the Bretton-Woods 
system and implemented the stabilization policy that was considered necessary in order to do that (the 
Pinay-Rueff plan). The decade from 1959 was actually one of stable prices and a stable French 
currency anchored on the gold standard. But it may be considered a parenthesis, since inflation again 
rose above 5 per cent a year as soon as 1969. The second possible regime change is the “tournant de la 
rigueur” (move to a policy of “austerity”) under President Mitterrand, when Keynesian 
macroeconomic policies were abandoned and monetary stabilization made a priority (a move dated 
either from the second devaluation of June 1982 or, more frequently, from March 1983). From 1983 
on, the inflation rate remained below 10 per cent by year. And the average inflation rate, which was as 
high as 15 per cent during the “Thirty Years War”, and still 6.5 per cent from 1950 to 1982, fell to 
only 2.5 per cent after 1983. This suggests that 1983 was the actual end of the long inflation episode. 
Another reason for considering the 1983 change as important can be seen in Figures 1 and 8: the 1958 
stabilization actually does not correspond to any marked change in the CAC-40, which was increasing 
up until 1955 and started decreasing from 1962 until it reached three minimum values in August 1967 
(468 points), February 1978 (307 points) and July 1981 (370 points). However, a clear switch to a 
period of sharply-rising stock prices can be observed in 1983. We then give in Table 10 (sections J, K, 
B and L) the values for long term performances for the 1951-1982 period as well as for the 1951-2006 
period, and for 1854-1913 and 1983-2006 for comparison. The real performance of the CAC-40 
changed from approximately 5 per cent per year before 1914 to null or slightly negative from 1951 to 
1982, and to a positive 10.6 per cent from 1983 to 2006. That glorious final period brings the average 
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yearly real returns during the second half of the 20th century to levels above those of the late 19th 
century.  
Then, we may consider that the major reason for the low performance of the CAC-40 index in the 20th 
century is the succession of two World Wars in the first half of the century. If we exclude these 
periods (as in section B of Table 10) the CAC-40 performs reasonably well over the very long run, 
although not as well as the US stock market. This is also true if we consider only the second half of the 
20th century. Nevertheless, it remains intriguing that this period includes two such different sub-
periods. This suggests that not only the World Wars, but maybe also policy regime changes may have 
a role in explaining the long term performances of the Paris stock market. 
In summary, when the 19th century appears as a normal and comprehensible period from the point of 
view of contemporary stock markets, the 20th century proves more difficult to assess. Two different 
accounts of the 20th century are possible. The first considers the long war period as the only reason for 
low stock returns, and insists on the normal level of equity returns over the very long term after 1950. 
The other, consistent with the “short 20th century” (1914-1982) view, considers that the period of 
exceptionally low real returns stopped only in 1983, a moment at which those who owned (or bought) 
stocks benefited from an exceptional increase in prices and returns, lasting up until recently. That view 
also claims that the recent period (since 1983) does not appear as a return to the 19th century: not only 
are overall real returns higher (which may result mostly from a shorter period, which incorporates little 
bear market yet), but volatility remains very high (actually slightly higher than in the “20th century”) 
and dividends remain low.  
 
Comparison with other investments  
A well-known result of US long term investment is the equity premium puzzle: in the long run, 
equities perform not only better than other investments, but the return they provide is higher than what 
their higher volatility requires as a compensation for risk. Although no explanation for this fact has 
found widespread acceptance, it has provoked much discussion; its validity outside the U.S. still 
requires detailed scrutiny using high quality data. In the French case, an equity premium also exists for 
the whole of our long period, but it remains low. Stocks are the best investment despite long periods of 
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negative real returns since bonds and the money market perform even worse. As shown in Table 11, 
the equity premium compared to bonds was 1.75 per cent on average from 1854 to 2006, and was 
below 2.5 per cent during all sub-periods except World War Two and the most recent period.   
TABLE 11 AROUNDHERE 
This level of equity premium seems more consistent with standard financial theory than the levels 
found in the US. Figure 9 draws a risk line for the French financial market for various sub-periods and 
table 10 gives detailed data for all periods. Although the evidence is indicative rather than conclusive, 
given the limited number of separate points included, Figure 9 suggests that returns were to some 
extent related to risks, with no excessive risk premium for equities.  
FIGURE 9 AROUND HERE 
 
Two points are striking. One is that the risk line moved a lot during the 1914-1982 period, compared 
to its position for the previous and subsequent periods. The second is the high risk and high return for 
investments in gold precisely from 1914 to 1982. In a period of unstable monetary regime, during 
which France was on the verge of hyperinflation at least once (at the end of World War Two), gold 
became a valeur refuge that was highly priced by French investors52.  Holding gold allowed one to 
escape both taxation and monetary confiscation, and provided sufficient liquidity despite the legal 
risks. In particular, gold was internationally valued and then provided for international diversification 
when it was forbidden by exchange controls. This was not an absurd behaviour, as has frequently been 
argued, since gold obtained the highest average return on that period despite paying no income. From 
the position of gold on the risk line, we can argue that an optimal French portfolio in keeping with the 
Markowitz definition should have included a significant proportion of gold from 1914 to 1982. This 
suggests French investors were rational in investing so much in gold, even if it may have been costly 
in terms of lost economic growth. On the other hand, gold was an underperforming asset during 
periods of stable prices, even if recent events suggest it can still protect against some risks.   
                                                 
52  Some of the prices for gold used here are measured on the black market, since at some periods there was 
no free market for gold in France. This may affect their reliability on the short run, and the volatility 
observed. 
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In summary, when stocks dominate gold (in stable periods) they also dominate bonds, while when 
gold beats stock (in inflationary periods) it also beats bonds. Then, the issue for French investors was 
not one of choosing over financial instruments but whether to invest in the (French) financial market 
or not. 
Investments in real estate may have been even better than gold. Existing data suggest not only that the 
return on a flat bought and rented out in Paris was approximately as high as the return on gold, but 
also that the risk was much lower53. This may explain why real estate investment was so much 
favoured by the French as a protection against inflation. Nevertheless, these high performances may 
also result from a simple liquidity premium and a survivor bias, since the success of Paris as a major 
international city cannot be compared to that of many other French towns, not to mention rural areas 
whose population fell during the period. It may well be that although the owners of Parisian flats did 
well by renting and reselling them (with a negative period of rent constraint mostly limited to 1914-
50), the result cannot be extended to other real-estate investments. 
Our data also look consistent with the performances of other markets: the risk line for 1854-1913 
drawn on Figure 10 suggests that returns in France were consistent with those for various financial 
assets on other markets. Jorion and Goetzmann suggested that the equity premium in the U.S. may be 
the result of a survivor bias at the level of the American market as a whole, compared to the global 
stock market, and that the U.S. actually diverged from most European countries after 1914, since they 
were much less affected by the two World Wars54. Our data suggest that the U.S. market performance 
was already very high before 1914, but also that this was the normal price to be paid to those willing 
                                                 
53   J. Friggit “Long Term (1800-2005) Investment in Gold, Bonds, Stocks and Housing in France – with 
Insights into the USA and the UK: a Few Regularities”, Working Paper, 2007, available at : 
http://www.adef.org/statistiques/engstathome.htm, builds an index for Parisian real estate using a repeated 
sales methodology; F. Simonnet, G. Gallais-Hamonno, and P. Arbulu "Un siècle de placement 
immobilier, l'exemple de La Fourmi Immobilière", Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris, 2ème 
trimestre 139, no2, (1998), pp.  95-135, collect stock prices of La Fourmi Immobilière, a firm who 
managed the same Parisian buildings on a pure-equity basis from 1905 to 1995. 
54   Jorion and Goetzmann, “Global Stock Markets”. 
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to participate in such a risky market compared to the French one55, making its holding consistent with 
an optimal international allocation of capital56. 
FIGURE 10 AROUND HERE 
 
A long marginalized financial market 
The poor performance of the French stock index for the “short 20th century” might result from 
inefficient pricing or from exogenous shocks on the French economy. We will argue in another article 
that the functioning of the French market was not qualitatively different from that of other markets. 
We will show below that the behaviour of the index cannot be separated from the long decline in 
financial markets in 20th century France, itself a by-product of its economic and political history. 
 
We consider that the singular trajectory of the CAC-40 must be related to the structural changes in the 
French financial market during the 20th century. The first one is the impact of the wars. This is visible 
in the evolution of dividend payments (Figure 11), which fell after the First and even more after the 
Second World War (beyond the cap imposed during the war). It resulted partly from the negative 
impact of the wars on profits, and partly from inflation, which made nominal profits and dividends 
appear higher than their true level, and exposed them to high taxes. In the case of public utilities 
subject to government price regulation, inflation frequently led to price caps and to a reduction in 
profits57. As we already mentioned, the decrease in dividend yields may have resulted from an 
adaptation of firms to the rise in corporate and personal income taxes, a rise which was very sharp 
during and after World War One and was followed by a gradual decrease that only really started in 
                                                 
55   The US index used here is broader than ours, which may partly explain a higher return and volatility, but 
the difference is too big to be explained entirely by that fact. 
56  D. Le Bris, “Why Did French Investors Buy Foreign Assets Before World War One?”, Working Paper, 
2008. 
57  P.-C. Hautcoeur and S. Grottard, “Taxation of Corporate Profits, Inflation and Income Distribution in 
France, 1914-1926”, Working paper, Delta, 2001. 
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196058. The 1914 level of overall dividend payments by the CAC-40 firms was not surpassed until 
1968. 
FIGURE 11 AROUND HERE 
The main explanation for this is not an overall stagnation of the economy or even of profits. It is the 
government interference in many firms, and especially the nationalization of many of the biggest 
corporations. The nationalized firms were certainly not always as profitable as they had been 
previously, as in the case of the railways, whose profits had been stagnating for years (partly because 
of regulation). Nevertheless, the nationalization of the arms industry and the railways (1937), and after 
World War Two that of the electricity, coal, gas, insurance and banking industries (including Bank of 
France), deprived the stock markets of many of their biggest listed securities. The last (short-lived) 
case was the 1982 nationalization of major industrial firms (Thomson, Saint-Gobain, Rhône-Poulenc, 
Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlman, Usinor) and the remaining big banks (Indosuez, Paribas, CIC, Crédit du 
Nord, CCF, Rothschild). This explains the evolution of the ratio of CAC-40 firms (and of total 
capitalization) to GDP (Figure 12).  
FIGURE 12 AROUND HERE 
In 1983, the ratio of CAC-40 capitalization to GDP was minimal59. It rose sharply in the next two 
decades thanks to two radical moves: the privatization of almost all the government-owned 
manufacturing, financial and utilities firms, and the rise in the stock index. This rise was also largely 
the result of the regime change of 1983, by which the French government allowed the financial market 
to play a major role in the economy again. A substantial rise in profits, which was a condition for 
French firms to attract investors, followed, and French stock prices became well integrated with 
international markets (especially after the suppression of the last exchange controls in 1986). From 
1983 onwards, then, the stock index again provides a measure that is relevant for the study of the 
French economy. This is confirmed by a simple measure: the most important sudden (month to month) 
                                                 
58   On the creation of profit taxation in France and the problems in measuring its impact in an inflationary 
period, see Hautcoeur & Grottard, “Taxation of Corporate Profit”; on the taxation level in France in the 
20th century, see Th. Piketty,  Les hauts revenus en France au XXe siècle (Paris, 2001). 
59  Minima were reached in 1951 (1.82 per cent) and 1983 (2.18 per cent). The 1882 maximum of 36 per 
cent for the CAC-40 was reached again in 1998. 
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variations in the CAC-40 during our period (those above 3 standard deviations from the mean) 
correspond almost exclusively to political events during the “short 20th century”, but almost never 
during the periods before 1914 or after 1983. From that last date, international financial crises replaced 
political news as the most influential factor on the stock market. Our data then confirms the intuition 
by Goetzmann that international and national politics can have a long-lasting impact on stock market 
performances60.  
 
IV CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We propose a new index of French stock prices. Compared to previous indices, ours is much more 
consistent with modern stock index methodologies that aim to measure portfolio performances for the 
investor. Because they had different objectives, previous indices dramatically overestimated the return 
in stock prices. Adequately measured stock returns, as in our CAC-40, present a radical regime change 
in 1914: because of a combination of the war’s impact on profits and assets, of war inflation and of the 
rise of taxation (the impact of which was multiplied by inflation, since it was applied to nominal 
incomes), stock prices decreased sharply in real terms. The same phenomenon occurred during the 
Second World War. In between, the stock market caught up a little, just to be hit by the Great 
Depression. Soon, nationalization affected a large proportion of listed firms, so that the size of the 
stock market decreased sharply. Up until the next regime change, the stock index performed badly. At 
the same time, by and large, the economic function of the stock market was restricted to a small 
proportion of the French economy, in which most major corporations were State-owned. This was 
reversed in the 1980s, which explains the recent rise in the size of the stock market. 
We consider this interpretation more consistent than the one according to which stock prices have 
risen in France almost as if no significant event had affected the country in the 20th century. More 
importantly, we wonder whether the same story – or a variation on it – may apply to many other 
European countries since the same destructive wars provided similar experiences of financial 
repression, taxation and inflation throughout Europe. Actually, the same methodological problems we 
                                                 
60  Goetzmann, “Will History Rhyme”. 
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have mentioned affected at least some foreign indices during some periods. For example, during the 
interwar period, most of them included only manufacturing firms, excluding financial services and 
utilities which weigh heavily in actual portfolios. In many cases, indices were also built without 
weighting by market capitalization (either without weighting or weighting by nominal capital, book 
value or transaction volumes). At least in some cases, these indices are still in use today when one 
looks at these periods (Table 12). As we have seen in the French case, this may mean that the 
performances of investment in some stock markets have been grossly overestimated. 
TABLE 12 AROUND HERE 
More broadly, optimistic assessments of the long term performances of stock investment must be 
tempered: equities clearly provided a better return than other financial assets on the very long run in 
France as elsewhere. However, the frequent extrapolation from Siegel’s results on the U.S. market to 
the existence of a “Siegel’s constant” of 6 to 7 per cent yearly total real return for such investments 
must be mitigated61. Equities provided no mysterious premium in France. The total real return on the 
CAC-40 varied from –18 per cent to 13 per cent, depending on the period, with an average of only 
1.17 per cent for the whole 1854-2006 period and, more comparably, of 5.5 per cent if one excludes 
the world wars. Even after World War Two, returns were negligible for a long time, up to the 1983 
regime change. Policies hostile to stock markets, affecting their role in economic development, also 
affected the return on equities. If equities protected investors reasonably well against inflation outside 
the war periods, they protected them only modestly against political risks; this was true not only in the 
short but also in the long term. In the very long run, equities may still have been the best investment, 
but this was not the case for all generations of investors. If the 1914 to 1982 period was a parenthesis, 
it was a long one, and one that provides us with non-negligible experience; an experience which may 
also explain common elements in the attitude towards financial markets among the European countries 
that experienced it.  
 
Appendix 1: Sources for the index 
                                                 
61  For example, see A. Smither and  S. Wright. Valuing Wall Street, Protecting Wealth in Turbulent 
Markets (New-York, 2000). 
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Cote officielle (entire period)   Journal des finances (1869-today) 
Cote des valeurs en banque (1899-1913)  Cote Desfossés (1895-today) 
Journal des chemins de fer (1842-1940)  La vie française (1945-today). 
Journal des actionnaires (1852-1930)  Journal du crédit public (1855-1934) 
Agence économique et financière (Agefi) (1911-today)  
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T A B L E S  
 
Table 1. Market capitalization of the Paris  Table 2. First seven capitalizations on the Paris Bourse,  
stock market (I) and that of the 40 firms in  the weight of Suez, January 1936. 
our index (II),all in current francs (euros in 2004). 
 
total market value Cac 40 market value
I II II/I (%)
1854 2,649,969,653 2,315,272,443 87
1864 4,359,991,607 3,971,862,650 91
1874 5,243,315,713 4,836,654,075 92
1884 9,430,442,250 8,285,218,090 88
1894 9,723,901,752 8,497,492,525 87
1904 11,153,390,647 8,656,808,620 78
1914 17,882,613,250 12,000,103,600 67
1924 46,504,668,688 23,141,902,070 50
1934 61,453,148,800 39,297,627,260 64
1945 344,273,820,138 146,588,425,880 43
1954 1,271,802,198,209 541,832,815,765 43
1964 64,432,788,900 41,592,062,800 65
1974 106,803,924,450 68,074,124,800 64
1984 260,161,534,600 162,726,587,500 63
1994 2,278031,642,440 1,624,454,500,000 71
2004 1,146,900,000,000 884,462,865,537 77
Capitalizations
  
Share names Capitalizations
Canal maritime de Suez, ordinary shares 8,024,456,160
Crédit Foncier de France 2,291,250,000
Banque de France 1,697,250,000
Canal maritime de Suez, Société civile 1,652,111,850
Canal maritime de Suez, parts de fondateurs 1,634,000,000
Canal maritime de Suez, Actions de jouissance 1,394,668,800
Crédit Lyonnais 1,329,600,000  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for our index and the Arbulu-SGF-INSEE indices. 
Arbulu Cac 40 Arbulu Cac 40 SGF Cac 40 INSEE Cac 40
SGF-INSEE
Mean (annualized) 6.34% 3.34% 2.33% 1.04% 11.47% 6.40% 9.21% 4.81%
T-test (p-value) 11.12% 42.98% 34.69% 29.20%
Standard Deviation (annualized) 14.70% 16.35% 7.36% 7.78% 23.16% 22.80% 15.87% 20.46%
F-Test (p-Value) 0.00% 6.65% 72.04% 0.00%
Kurtosis 7.37 7.81 8.25 9.46 4.15 4.27 4.03 5.47
Skewness 58% 14% -0.34 -0.50 0.60 0.58 -0.15 -0.40
Range 46% 58% 23% 26% 44% 41% 34% 53%
Minimum -18% -33% -14% -14% -17% -16% -18% -33%
Maximum 27% 25% 9% 11% 27% 25% 16% 20%
Count 1,643 1,643 791 791 336 336 528 528
Jarque-Berra 1,378 1,606 899 1,359 34 36 19 116
Confidence Level(95,0%) 0.0021 0.0023 0.0015 0.0016 0.0072 0.0071 0.0039 0.0050
1854-1918 1919-1946 1947-1990
Descriptive statistics of Arbulu-SGF-INSEE and CAC 40
1854-1990
 
Table 4. Actual share in total capitalization, weight in the INSEE index of stocks included in the 
“chemicals” industry index, and their ratio. All for 1963. Shares over-represented in the INSEE index (II/I 
>100 per cent) are in column 4, which gives the degree of over-representation. The same for under-
representation in column 5. 
Weight in
in francs % Total General Index
Capitalisation INSEE
I II II/I II/I
Produits Chimiques d'Auby 103,962,700 0.09% 0.71% 771%
Bordealise de Produits Chimiques 0.71%
Glaces de Boussois 558,000,000 0.49% 0.71% 144%
Le Carbonne-Lorraine 103,082,000 0.09% 0.71% 777%
Clin-Byla 158,800,000 0.14% 0.71% 504%
Cotelle et Foucher 74,513,000 0.07% 0.71% 1075%
Jean Lefèbvre 146,640,000 0.13% 0.71% 546%
Française des Glycérines 87,552,000 0.08% 0.71% 915%
Huiles, Goudrons et Dérivés 122,949,000 0.11% 0.71% 652%
Kuhlmann 841,522,000 0.74% 0.71% 95%
Roger Bellon 95,200,000 0.08% 0.71% 841%
Laboratoire Toraude 83,700,000 0.07% 0.71% 957%
Nobel-Bozel 214,405,000 0.19% 0.71% 374%
Péchiney 1,815,460,000 1.61% 0.71% 44%
Gle d'Engrais Pierrefitte 145,935,000 0.13% 0.71% 549%
Produits Azotés 170,550,000 0.15% 0.71% 470%
Progil 493,050,000 0.44% 0.71% 162%
Rhône-Poulenc 5,213,000,000 4.61% 0.71% 15%
Roussel-Uclaf 778,000,000 0.69% 0.71% 103%
Saint-Gobain 2,613,863,000 2.31% 0.71% 31%
SIFA 207,060,000 0.18% 0.71% 387%
Ugine 1,575,280,000 1.39% 0.71% 51%
Total market capitalization (INSEE) 112,974,027,000
Market Capitalization weight in INSEE index /
% of the total
market capitalization
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Table 5. INSEE indices including or excluding  Table 7. Comparison of Euronext’s CAC-40 (Cac1), our 
firms nationalized in 1944.     index (Cac2) and an index using the official CAC 
      composition in each January but without the within-                           
Source: Laforest & Sallee (1969)   year adjustments (Cac3).   
  included excluded
December, 1st 1939 131 147
December, 1st 1941 380 432
December, 1st 1942 590 705
December, 1st 1943 529 676
December, 1st 1944 489 705
December, 1st 1945 450 798
Nationalized firms
INSEE Indices
  
Euronext
Cac 40 40 firsts same
capitalizations components
Cac1 Cac2 Cac3
Mean 12.32% 11.69% 12.90%
Standard-deviation 18.74% 17.80% 18.17%
Kurtosis 3.16 2.99 2.89
Skewness -0.01 0.06 0.09
T-test (p-value)* 93.85% 94%
F-test (p-value)* 57.88% 74%
Correlation coefficient* 0.993 0.989
Annualised monthly price variations (1988-1997)
Approximate Cac 40
* compared with Euronext Cac 40  
 
 
Table 6. Summary of the differences between the CAC-40* and the Arbulu-SGF-INSEE index 
stocks included industries 
weighting
stocks weighting survivor bias treatment of 
nationalizations
CAC-40* 40 no industries yes no standard
Arbulu-SGF-INSEE most of them Yes no some Flawed  
 
Table 8. Differences between equal-weight and market cap weight Cac 40 (1854-1997) 
average stdev arit geo stdev arit geo stdev arit geo stdev
I equally-weight Cac 40 3.93% 1.38% 4.24% 2.52% 19.79% 8.16% 6.45% 20.07% 2.93% 0.97% 19.97%
II Cac 40 3.85% 1.41% 3.71% 2.21% 18.46% 7.56% 6.07% 18.72% 2.38% 0.61% 19.14%
Differance I-II 0.08% -0.03% 0.53% 0.31% 1.32% 0.60% 0.38% 1.35% 0.55% 0.36% 0.83%
Dividend Yield Annual Price variation Total Nominal Return Total Real Return
 
 
 
Table 9. Major characteristics of the CAC-40  Table 11. Equity premium compared to either 
returns (distinguishing price variation and  bonds or bills for various periods  
dividend yield) for various periods    (in percentage).            
(in percentage). 
1854-2006 1854-1913 1914-2006 1951-1982 1983-2006
Price variation
Arithmetic Mean 4.18 1.11 6.2 3.63 12.83
Standard Deviation 19.12 7.32 23.63 24.21 24.16
Dividend yield
Arithmetic Mean 3.84 4.52 3.41 3.64 3.15
Standard Deviation 1.39 0.95 1.46 1.77 0.78
Total nominal return
Arithmetic Mean 8.02 5.55 9.61 7.28 15.98
Standard Deviation 19.31 7.53 23.95 24.58 24.34  
arit geo arit geo
1854-2006 1.75% 0.96% 3.45% 1.98%
1854-1913 1.37% 1.34% 2.52% 2.25%
1914-1922 0.48% 0.69% -3.49% -3.46%
1923-1938 -1.27% -1.63% 2.45% 1.12%
1939-1950 5.85% 3.24% 6.35% 2.80%
1951-1982 2.24% 0.37% 1.06% -1.40%
1983-2006 1.65% 0.28% 9.29% 6.75%
1951-2006 1.93% 0.29% 4.72% 2.09%
Equity premium
stocks minus bonds stocks minus bills
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Table 12 Methodology of the stock market indices published by the League of Nations  
This table summarizes the main elements of the methods of the indices published under the title “indices of 
market value of industrial shares” by the League of Nations in its Statistical Yearbooks (the information here 
comes from the 1938 edition, pp. 249) in order to compare the evolutions of stock markets during the interwar 
period. In the last column, we tried to document whether these indices have been used, directly or indirectly, in 
Dimson & alii, Triumph of the Optimists. 
 
 
Country Compiled by Components Number 
of stocks 
Method Price Used 
in    
 DMS 
Germany Government 
authority 
Mining and heavy industries 
Manufacturing industries 
213 
 
Arithmetic average weighted by 
amount of nominal capital of all 
German companies of each class 
on 31/12/1926 
     Monthly 
average   
   of daily rates 
Yes 
1924 
-1943 
Austria Institut für 
Conjunkturforschung 
Building trades      Iron and metal 
Breweries               Paper 
Chemical               Textile 
Electricity              Mines 
Sugar                      other industries 
34 Simple arithmetic mean  15th or middle 
of 
    month 
NS 
Belgium Central Bank Eight groups: 
Gas and electricity  Glass industry 
Metallurgy              Textiles and silk 
Collieries                 Colonial industries 
Miscellaneous          Zinc, lead and 
nes 
80 Group indices are calculated by 
simple arithmetic average 
General index is weighted 
according to  the relative 
importance of each group 
(idem France) 
   Beginning of 
    following 
month 
Yes 
1926 
-1944 
 
Canada Government 
authority 
 68 Weight by amount of stocks 
outstanding. Account is taken of 
the issue of new shares and 
capital reconstruction 
    Monthly 
average 
   of daily rates 
No 
Denmark Government 
authority 
? 21 Arithmetic average weighted by 
book capital of the different 
undertakings 
    Average of 
    highest and 
lowest rates of 
    month 
Probably 
Spain Central Bank Five groups: 
Food                        Steel and metallurgy 
Electricity                Building industry 
Miscellaneous 
35 Simple arithmetic average ? ? 
Greece Conseil Supérieur 
Economique 
Tobacco                   Chemical industry 
Mills 
7 Geometric average of individual 
indices weighted by the number 
of transactions realized in the 
period I/1928 to XII/1929 
? NS 
Italy Prof. F. Guarneri Ten groups: 
Mining                      Chemical industries 
Metallurgy                Textiles 
Engineering               Electricity 
Motor-cars                 Food industries 
Water supply             Sundry manufact. 
74 Arithmetic average weighted by 
the capital of companies. Changes 
in capital and formation or 
suppression of companies re 
taken into account 
   Last week or 
end 
    of month 
No 
Japan Tokyo Stock 
Exchange 
Three groups: 
Textile                       Mines 
Manufacturing industries 
64 ?     Average of 
    highest and 
lowest rates of 
month 
Yes 
Before 
1915 
Norway Government 
authority 
All shares 8 Geometric mean weighted by the 
percentage of paid-up value of 
each share 
 15th or middle 
of 
   month 
Yes 
1918 
-1938 
Netherlands Government 
authority 
Ten groups: 
Engineering                        Chemical 
Shipbuilding                       Oil and fats 
Electrical industry              Electric-light 
Textiles                              Tobacco 
Miscellaneous                     Food   
 
51 Simple geometric mean but the 
list of shares account has been 
taken of the relative importance 
of various industries 
    Monthly 
average of rates 
taking one 
    day in the 
week 
Probably 
Sweden Affärsvärlden Industrial and shipping shares 52 ?    Last week or 
end 
    of month 
Yes 
1919 
-1938 
 Switzerland Central Bank All industrial companies 26 Nominal value of paid-up capital 
serving as base 
   Last week or 
end of month 
? 
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Table 10. Returns for various investments in French assets for 1854 to 2006 and various sub-periods 
Inflation
Dividend Annual Total Total Coupon Annual Total Total Annual Total Interest Total INSEE
Yield Price Nominal Real Yield Price Nominal Real Price Real Yield Real
Variation Return Return* Variation Return Return Variation Return Return
arit 3.84% 4.18% 8.02% 3.05% 5.22% 0.76% 5.98% 1.30% 7.47% 1.82% 4.36% -0.40% 5.64%
geo 2.56% 6.42% 1.17% 0.21% 5.40% 0.21% 5.18% -0.01% 4.33% -0.81%
stdev 1.39% 19.12% 19.31% 19.74% 2.76% 10.54% 11.23% 14.41% 30.29% 24.77% 2.88% 8.50% 10.46%
arit 4.01% 4.25% 8.26% 5.53% 5.40% 1.38% 6.78% 4.19% 3.58% 0.72% 4.53% 1.94% 2.79%
geo 2.74% 6.78% 4.02% 0.83% 6.20% 3.46% 2.69% 0.05% 4.49% 1.82%
stdev 1.31% 18.43% 18.56% 18.28% 2.62% 10.55% 11.25% 12.24% 15.67% 12.88% 3.00% 4.78% 5.41%
arit 4.52% 1.11% 5.55% 5.35% 3.78% 0.36% 4.14% 3.98% 0.00% -0.22% 3.05% 2.83% 0.38%
geo 0.84% 5.28% 5.00% 0.19% 3.97% 3.66% 0.00% -0.30% 3.04% 2.75%
stdev 0.95% 7.32% 7.53% 8.92% 0.73% 5.59% 5.78% 7.85% 0.00% 3.86% 1.23% 4.45% 3.93%
arit 3.44% 3.56% 7.00% -2.82% 5.57% -1.27% 4.29% -4.94% 17.00% 5.49% 4.68% -4.81% 11.31%
geo 1.26% 4.70% -5.35% -1.88% 3.71% -6.25% 12.45% 1.66% 4.64% -5.41%
stdev 1.54% 22.95% 23.30% 23.01% 2.36% 10.95% 11.13% 15.39% 42.92% 36.01% 2.92% 10.24% 12.95%
arit 3.41% 6.20% 9.61% 1.53% 6.16% 0.99% 7.16% -0.48% 12.34% 3.14% 5.23% -2.51% 9.08%
geo 3.72% 7.14% -1.26% 0.19% 6.32% -2.02% 8.69% 0.17% 5.18% -3.06%
stdev 1.46% 23.63% 23.95% 24.22% 2.76% 12.80% 13.19% 16.64% 38.17% 31.62% 3.29% 9.75% 11.86%
arit 3.73% -2.00% 1.74% -10.45% 4.61% -4.17% 0.44% -10.93% 14.26% 0.39% 5.03% -6.96% 14.39%
geo -2.78% 0.96% -11.12% -4.42% 0.17% -11.82% 11.15% -2.16% 5.03% -7.66%
stdev 0.50% 12.26% 12.44% 11.22% 0.64% 6.90% 7.35% 13.01% 29.96% 24.53% 0.64% 11.80% 13.27%
arit 3.87% 2.80% 6.66% 1.70% 4.59% 2.51% 7.10% 2.97% 8.83% 3.52% 3.29% -0.74% 5.02%
geo 0.73% 4.63% 0.05% 1.76% 6.34% 1.69% 7.89% 3.17% 3.28% -1.07%
stdev 0.63% 20.88% 21.08% 18.78% 0.95% 12.50% 12.82% 16.30% 14.99% 8.53% 1.65% 8.00% 9.87%
arit 1.78% 7.20% 8.98% -14.34% 3.62% -1.74% 1.88% -20.20% 43.72% 14.20% 1.80% -20.69% 30.14%
geo 3.69% 5.35% -18.47% -2.47% 1.16% -21.71% 28.16% -0.81% 1.80% -21.26%
stdev 1.34% 28.79% 29.55% 27.95% 0.66% 12.09% 12.18% 15.35% 86.51% 76.59% 0.39% 9.42% 15.86%
arit 3.64% 3.63% 7.28% 0.89% 7.08% -2.14% 4.94% -1.35% 11.98% 4.77% 6.73% -0.17% 6.61%
geo 1.16% 4.81% -1.62% -2.71% 4.42% -1.99% 9.28% 2.58% 6.67% -0.21%
stdev 1.77% 24.21% 24.58% 24.27% 2.68% 10.41% 10.49% 10.98% 27.70% 23.66% 3.52% 2.97% 3.99%
arit 3.51% 7.80% 11.31% 6.38% 7.38% 1.93% 9.31% 4.45% 6.07% 0.91% 6.54% 1.66% 4.89%
geo 5.15% 8.68% 3.68% 1.02% 8.38% 3.40% 4.32% -0.48% 6.49% 1.60%
stdev 1.55% 24.51% 24.80% 24.64% 2.92% 13.59% 14.30% 14.84% 22.23% 18.82% 3.45% 3.49% 3.76%
arit 3.15% 12.83% 15.98% 13.23% 7.43% 6.83% 14.27% 11.58% -1.64% -3.90% 6.03% 3.94% 2.41%
geo 10.12% 13.32% 10.66% 5.66% 13.03% 10.38% -1.84% -4.14% 5.99% 3.91%
stdev 0.78% 24.16% 24.34% 23.60% 2.75% 15.56% 16.46% 16.04% 6.29% 6.75% 3.16% 2.59% 1.27%
arit: arithmetic mean ; geo: geometric mean ; stdev: standard-deviation
* A F-test bewteen stocks and bonds (total nominal return) can reject an equal variance for all periods whereas a T-test can't reject (5 % level) an equal mean for F,G,J,K,L
** Rente 3 %, 5% after 1950 and after 1970, taux obligations Etat à long terme (Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations)
*** Gold Price in Paris, annual interpolate, (Banque de France and INSEE)
**** before 1951 : Discount Rate Open Market Paris, monthly data, (NBER)
annual data interpolate, taux de l'escompte Banque de France, (INSEE) only before 1863, 1914-1925, 1940-1951 
1952-2008 : Taux Moyen du Marché monétaire, monthly data (Banque de France)
L. from january 1983 (inflation < 10 %) to december 2006
A. from january 1854 to december 2006
B. from january 1854 to december 2006 (without world wartimes, 1914-1922 and 1939-1950)
C. from january 1854 to december 1913
D. from january 1914 to december 1982
E. from january 1914 to december 2006
F. from january 1914 to december 1922
Cac 40 French State Bonds**
G. from january 1923 to december 1938
H. from january 1939 to december 1950
J. from january 1951 to december 1982
K. from january 1951 to december 2006
Gold*** Bills****
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Our CAC-40 index, Arbulu-SGF-INSEE index. 1854=108 basis    Figure 2 Correlation between the monthly price variations of the official      
(allows to join the official CAC-40 at 1,000 in 1988).      and our index methodology, 1988-97 
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Figure 3. Shares of the biggest and smallest capitalizations in our CAC-40,   Figure 4 Average weight of the firms in the CAC-40 ordered by weight. 
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Figure 5. Monthly price variation of the CAC-40 index, 1854-2006   Figure 6 Dividend yield for CAC-40 firms. 
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Figure 7. 2006Long term performance of investment strategies   Figure 8. Average total real return of CAC 40 and French government bonds (10 
in various French assets         years rolling window). 
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Figure 9. Risk-return line for the French financial market, over three periods  Figure 10. International risk-return line, 1854-1913 
(S: stocks, Bo: Bonds, Bi: Bills, G: Gold). Sources: see bottom of Table 9. Sources: US Stocks: 1854-1870 : monthly data, “Old NYSE” Goetzmann, Ibbotson, Peng 
(2000), 1871-2008: monthly data, Cowles-S&P according to Shiller version, available online: 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm, US long term rates: 1854-1871: New England 
selected interest rates, annual data interpolated, Homer & Sylla (1998), 1871-1913: monthly 
data, Schiller online, US Bills: 1854-1913: open market rate of discount, annual average 
interpolated, Homer & Sylla (1998), French Bills: 1854-1864: Banque de France‘s taux 
d’escompte, annual data interpolated, INSEE’s Statistical Yearbooks, 1864-1913: taux du 
marché interbancaire, monthly data, NBER and Banque de France), UK Consols: 1854-1913: 
monthly data, Kloveland (1994), UK Bills: 1854-1913: open market rate of discount, annual 
average interpolated,  Homer & Sylla (1998) 
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Figure 11  Dividends paid by Cac 40 firms, 1854-2006 Figure 12. Ratio of the capitalization of CAC-40 firms and the total 
capitalization of French listed firms to GDP 
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Appendix 2 Yearly values of our CAC-40 price index and total return index 
 
Date Price Total Return Date Price Total Return Date Price Total Return Date Price Total Return
Index Index Index Index Index Index Index Index
06/01/1854 108.88              108.88              06/01/1893 172.11              1,126.37           04/01/1932 211.88              5,902.42           07/01/1971 628.12              48,715.58         
05/01/1855 114.01              119.60              05/01/1894 179.39              1,221.16           04/01/1933 250.96              7,314.45           05/01/1972 566.86              45,949.23         
04/01/1856 126.51              138.66              04/01/1895 171.32              1,209.57           04/01/1934 244.04              7,400.37           03/01/1973 636.41              53,738.75         
02/01/1857 139.58              158.53              03/01/1896 170.20              1,244.98           04/01/1935 216.10              6,854.24           02/01/1974 589.09              52,035.05         
08/01/1858 132.48              160.63              08/01/1897 179.01              1,351.10           04/01/1936 208.27              6,902.53           08/01/1975 401.38              37,915.41         
07/01/1859 124.26              158.82              07/01/1898 191.87              1,490.16           05/01/1937 237.04              8,119.71           02/01/1976 502.29              50,029.48         
06/01/1860 121.69              163.65              06/01/1899 193.66              1,554.21           07/01/1938 216.76              7,691.22           07/01/1977 417.79              44,379.79         
06/01/1861 123.28              173.78              05/01/1900 194.18              1,609.34           09/01/1939 219.50              8,143.89           06/01/1978 324.13              36,922.64         
06/01/1862 127.00              189.86              04/01/1901 194.65              1,673.23           03/01/1940 244.66              9,483.83           05/01/1979 498.66              59,849.53         
15/01/1862 141.90              223.77              04/01/1902 177.05              1,582.24           03/01/1941 351.56              13,979.58         04/01/1980 518.74              65,241.02         
04/02/1864 130.64              218.78              02/01/1903 172.37              1,593.96           05/01/1942 529.77              21,374.61         02/01/1981 535.26              70,983.84         
06/01/1865 131.24              233.93              09/01/1904 170.47              1,638.70           08/01/1943 805.56              32,838.92         08/01/1982 442.55              63,061.17         
05/01/1866 132.50              251.72              06/01/1905 174.57              1,741.83           07/01/1944 657.33              27,028.48         06/01/1983 453.74              69,620.61         
04/01/1867 132.20              265.86              05/01/1906 177.10              1,835.96           02/01/1945 575.78              23,870.50         05/01/1984 689.29              110,466.22       
03/01/1868 124.50              264.81              04/01/1907 175.16              1,888.97           04/01/1946 458.14              19,083.94         03/01/1985 760.33              126,465.80       
08/01/1869 133.76              299.68              03/01/1908 171.33              1,922.02           02/01/1947 579.27              24,297.73         02/01/1986 1,010.33           173,391.94       
07/01/1870 134.37              317.50              08/01/1909 175.21              2,043.21           08/01/1948 466.19              19,812.78         09/01/1987 1,364.97           239,699.03       
06/01/1871 99.58                250.68              07/01/1910 184.51              2,237.14           06/01/1949 408.40              17,685.07         01/01/1988 1,000.00           182,749.73       
05/01/1872 116.72              306.15              07/01/1911 183.93              2,312.05           05/01/1950 335.28              14,893.46         01/01/1989 1,642.99           310,139.84       
03/01/1873 123.79              342.13              05/01/1912 190.82              2,490.05           04/01/1951 273.35              12,648.10         01/01/1990 1,994.36           387,671.76       
09/01/1874 126.08              368.72              03/01/1913 195.84              2,647.00           03/01/1952 381.25              18,250.54         01/01/1991 1,547.66           313,564.75       
02/01/1875 130.07              404.05              02/01/1914 189.06              2,653.29           08/01/1953 417.29              20,795.61         01/01/1992 1,770.30           373,138.73       
02/01/1876 143.07              467.94              02/01/1915 161.86              2,360.16           07/01/1954 493.77              25,611.91         01/01/1993 1,852.63           404,415.34       
05/01/1877 145.56              499.91              07/01/1916 141.47              2,134.89           06/01/1955 1,046.37           55,284.76         01/01/1994 2,307.55           516,682.48       
04/01/1878 146.49              526.15              05/01/1917 157.96              2,468.47           05/01/1956 987.07              53,259.57         01/01/1995 1,886.40           437,200.44       
03/01/1879 153.45              574.20              04/01/1918 159.99              2,590.71           03/01/1957 997.66              54,937.52         01/01/1996 1,917.72           459,902.49       
02/01/1880 164.65              641.78              03/01/1919 170.59              2,858.64           03/01/1958 1,123.45           62,790.05         01/01/1997 2,282.76           562,296.37       
01/01/1881 194.93              787.09              02/01/1920 178.07              3,089.72           08/01/1959 1,011.77           57,440.66         01/01/1998 2,919.81           733,927.79       
06/01/1882 238.81              996.43              07/01/1921 159.50              2,883.73           07/01/1960 1,267.19           72,799.47         01/01/1999 4,245.42           1,090,596.33    
05/01/1883 190.15              827.07              06/01/1922 144.79              2,752.65           05/01/1961 1,157.89           67,574.13         01/01/2000 5,917.37           1,548,371.96    
04/01/1884 175.02              796.86              05/01/1923 171.39              3,394.91           04/01/1962 1,195.43           70,885.77         01/01/2001 5,758.02           1,544,214.79    
02/01/1885 176.35              837.85              04/01/1924 208.76              4,288.40           03/01/1963 1,050.71           63,380.47         01/01/2002 4,682.79           1,301,347.71    
08/01/1886 172.65              856.55              02/01/1925 207.85              4,434.84           02/01/1964 839.80              51,808.99         01/01/2003 3,187.88           917,178.76       
07/01/1887 172.66              891.86              08/01/1926 229.55              5,105.74           07/01/1965 753.57              47,674.30         01/01/2004 3,596.80           1,064,233.41    
06/01/1888 169.39              912.32              07/01/1927 274.42              6,356.81           06/01/1966 697.40              45,394.46         01/01/2005 3,877.96           1,176,991.78    
04/01/1889 168.89              946.94              05/01/1928 331.79              7,972.83           05/01/1967 559.87              37,603.94         06/01/2006 4,867.15           1,505,106.81    
03/01/1890 171.83              1,000.79           04/01/1929 479.68              11,828.56         04/01/1968 527.73              36,779.64         05/01/2007 5,517.35           1,748,168.56    
02/01/1891 181.98              1,100.58           03/01/1930 466.74              11,839.18         02/01/1969 597.09              43,177.44         
08/01/1892 178.94            1,125.49           03/01/1931 329.28            8,667.91         08/01/1970 715.95             53,394.12        
 
 
 
